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Autobiographical memory (AM) and social cognition share common properties and both are
affected in autism spectrum disorders (ASD). So far, most of the scant research in ASD has
concerned adults, systematically reporting impairment of the episodic component.The only
study to be conducted with children concluded that they have poorer personal semantic
knowledge than typical developing children.The present study explores the development of
both components of AM in an 8-year-old boy diagnosed with Asperger’s syndrome, based
on three examinations in 2007, 2008, and 2010. On each occasion, he underwent a gen-
eral neuropsychological assessment including theory of mind (ToM) tasks, and a specially
designed AM task allowing us to test both the semantic and the episodic components for
three lifetime periods (current year, previous year, and earlier years). We observed diffi-
culties in strategic retrieval and ToM, with a significant improvement between the second
and third examinations. Regarding AM, different patterns of performance were noted in
all three examinations: (1) relative preservation of current year personal knowledge, but
impairment for the previous and earlier years, and (2) impairment of episodic memory for
the current and previous year, but performances similar to those of controls for the earlier
years.The first pattern can be explained by abnormal forgetting and by the semanticization
mechanism, which needs verbal communication and social interaction to be efficient. The
second pattern suggests that the development of episodic memory only reached the stage
of “event memory.” This term refers to memory for personal events lacking in details or
spatiotemporal specificity, and is usually observed in children younger than five. We con-
clude that the abnormal functioning of social cognition in ASD, encompassing social, and
personal points of view, has an impact on both components of AM.
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INTRODUCTION
A growing body of research has demonstrated that autobiograph-
ical memory (AM) and social cognition share several common
properties (Spreng and Mar, 2012). Given this functional overlap,
we would expect AM to be affected in Autism Spectrum Dis-
orders (ASD), as social cognition is impaired in this pathology.
ASD includes a range of neurodevelopmental disorders includ-
ing autism, Asperger’s syndrome, and pervasive developmental
disorders that are characterized by abnormalities in three core
areas: verbal and non-verbal communication, social interaction,
and restricted interests, and stereotyped behaviors. Within this
spectrum, Asperger’s syndrome differs from autism in that there
is no clinically significant cognitive or language delay.
Autobiographical memory refers to personal knowledge and
events relating to our own lives, and contributes to the
development of social cognition, from both a social and a personal
point of view. First, our memories of the past or of social inter-
actions may help us to infer the mental states of others and allow
us to adapt our own behavior accordingly. Hence, these mem-
ories help to increase our interpersonal knowledge. Second, we
shape our own selves by extracting meaning from some of our
autobiographical memories, described as self-defining memories,
to update our self-concept and create a dynamic self-memory
system (Singer, 2004). Crane et al. (2010) recently showed that
ASD patients are unable to elicit meaning from their memories,
which may render the self-memory relationship static, unlike that
of typical adults.
Social cognition encompasses to the cognitive processes used to
decode and encode the social world. It encompasses the perception
of others, the self, and interpersonal knowledge (Beer and Ochsner,
2006). Theory of mind (ToM) is the social cognitive ability to
impute mental states (intentions, beliefs, emotions, desires, etc.)
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to oneself and to others, and to use these attributions to under-
stand, predict, and explain the behavior of oneself and others.
A ToM impairment is clearly established in ASD and Baron-
Cohen et al. (1985) were the first to formulate the hypothesis of
a link between ToM deficit and the abnormalities in communi-
cation and social interaction displayed by individuals with ASD.
Difficulties with mentalizing or ToM clearly influence episodic
memory in different ways. Episodic memory relies on a dynamic
sense of self as differentiated from others or the ability to con-
sider that the self is continuous over time, from past to future,
as this allows children to organize and integrate personally expe-
rienced events within their self-concepts (Povinelli et al., 1996).
Because these abilities mature late in typical development, true
episodic memory does not emerge until around the age of 4 or
5 years (Perner and Ruffman, 1995; Wheeler et al., 1997; New-
combe et al., 2007) and continues to develop until adolescence
(Piolino et al., 2007; Willoughby et al., 2012). Converging behav-
ioral and neuroimaging data indicate that it is the psychological or
interpersonal component of the self, or higher-order psycholog-
ical self-awareness that is affected in ASD (Lind, 2010; Williams,
2010; Uddin, 2011). In ASD, the restricted ToM, or more specif-
ically “theory of own mind,” as suggested by Williams (2010),
has an impact on the internal state language associated with
memory narratives (Crane et al., 2010, 2011). This unstructured
psychological self cannot act as an effective memory organiza-
tional system, and thus precludes individuals from recollecting
specific autobiographical memories. Furthermore, the poor social
skills associated with ASD limit individuals’ social interactions.
These social interactions, especially parent-child interactions, play
a central role in the development of AM, by allowing children
to construct narratives about their personal events (Nelson and
Fivush, 2004). Limited linguistic interactions may adversely affect
the development of AM in ASD, and also prevent the external
rehearsal of narratives which, in typical individuals, enhances
memory.
The personal narratives provided in response to autobiographi-
cal questionnaires allow us to distinguish between personal seman-
tic memory or personal knowledge, and specific or episodic mem-
ory for autobiographical events (Cermak, 1984). All of the scant
research conducted in adults with ASD has reported significant
difficulties, mainly concerning the episodic component (God-
dard et al., 2007; Crane and Goddard, 2008; Lind and Bowler,
2010; Tanweer et al., 2010; Crane et al., 2012a). When invited
to evoke memories, ASD patients provide a list of facts, rather
than truly specific personal experiences (Goldman, 2008), lacking
in details and with few insight terms in their narratives (Crane
et al., 2010). These memories are very similar to the event mem-
ories produced by young children before the emergence of the
episodic memory system, as previously suggested by Maister and
Plaisted-Grant (2011). Access to AM is also impaired in ASD,
according to Crane et al. (2010, 2012a). It seems to take indi-
viduals with ASD longer to retrieve specific memories than it does
typical adults, and unlike the latter, self-relevance cues do not facil-
itate their retrieval of specific details. However, the methodologies
adopted by researchers may influence performance levels. Thus,
greater impairment of the episodic component has been observed
when participants with ASD are given a fluency task rather than
an interview task (Crane and Goddard, 2008), and they perform
just as well as controls on yes-no personal life event questions that
do not require them to remember any specific details (Bruck et al.,
2007), or when they are asked to write down their memories-a task
that limits social interaction (Crane et al., 2012b).
Episodic AM impairment can be observed in children with
ASD from the age of 8 (Losh and Capps, 2003) and as early as
5 years (Bruck et al., 2007). To date, the most recent study con-
ducted in children with ASD in this domain was published by
Brown et al. (2012), and interestingly focused on the quality of
event reports. When the authors analyzed memory narratives pro-
vided by a group of children with ASD aged 6–14 years, they
noticed that these children included fewer emotional, cognitive
(thoughts and beliefs), and perceptual terms than typical controls.
Contrary to their predictions, the children with ASD produced
just as many social terms as controls. However, they listed gen-
eral events lacking in details and social interactions. These results
are consistent with previous data published by Lee and Hobson
(1998). They were interested in the social attributes of the self, as
seen mainly through social interactions, and reported that children
and adolescents with ASD produced fewer social self-statements
than typical controls. This observation, like the smaller number
of emotional and cognitive terms found in personal narratives,
can be explained by the affective and cognitive ToM impair-
ment. Given the difficulty they have understanding their own
beliefs and emotions, coupled with their inability to adopt other
people’s perspectives, children with ASD cannot spontaneously
produce as many details as typical controls when they recall an
event.
Unlike the episodic component, the semantic component seems
intact in ASD adults, with no effect of lifetime period (Crane
and Goddard, 2008). However, as demonstrated by Bruck et al.
(2007), it does appear to be affected in children, which Lind (2010)
believes reflects delayed development of the self-concept. Despite
this hypothesis, there has been surprisingly little research on the
development of AM in ASD, and no follow-up studies have been
conducted so far, even though this approach is very useful for
investigating the development of AM. First, it allows researchers
to control for the interindividual variability that characterizes typ-
ical development (two individuals matched on chronological age
may well be at different stages of cognitive development). This
variability is even greater in ASD than in typical development,
and some impairments reported in published case studies would
not emerge in a group analysis. Second, longitudinal studies are
a unique means of investigating how memories change over time
and of testing the hypothesis of the delayed development of certain
cognitive skills in ASD.
We conducted a longitudinal study of a young boy with ASD
focusing on general cognitive functions and both components of
AM. The purpose of this investigation was to extend our under-
standing of the development of personal semantic knowledge
and episodic autobiographical memories by administering three
examinations over the space of 4 years. Assuming that the self-
memory relationship in ASD is static, rather than dynamic, owing
to both limited linguistic interaction and impaired episodic AM,
we predicted that Simon’s personal semantic knowledge would
be strongly related to the present, or here and now, and liable
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to be forgotten. Concerning the episodic component, memories
would presumably take the form of “event memories,” rather than
truly episodic memories (Maister and Plaisted-Grant, 2011). If
our assumption was correct, we would find that Simon’s earliest
memories, elaborated before the age at which episodic mem-
ory normally develops, were similar to those of typical chil-
dren. His more recent ones, however, encoded after the age of
6 years, would contain fewer details than those of typical chil-
dren. This gap in performances between typical children and our
child with ASD would increase with age, despite the therapeutic
interventions.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
CASE REPORT
We describe the neuropsychological follow-up of Simon, a young
boy who was diagnosed with Asperger’s syndrome on the basis of
the ICD-10 criteria and the Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised
(ADI-R; Lord et al., 1994), an experimenter-administered parent
interview that yields ratings for social, communicative, and repeti-
tive behavior symptoms based primarily on behavior reported for
the 4–5 year age period. This clinical instrument was used with
Simon’s mother at the age of 8 years. Three neuropsychological
examinations were administered in August 2007, October 2008,
and March 2010. Initial neuropsychological examination was con-
ducted just after the diagnosis at 8 years of age, and the two others
during the therapeutic follow-up.
Simon is the first-born of his family. During the first psychi-
atric consultation and the ADI-R interview, the mother reported
that delivery, pregnancy, and motor development were all normal.
Simon had no language delay: he said his first words at about
21 months and his first sentences at about 2 years. His mother
started to worry when Simon, by then aged 4 years, appeared
reluctant to interact socially with his peers. While he was at pri-
mary school, Simon was seen by a child psychiatrist and a speech
therapist, who suggested to his parents that he might be a gifted
child.
At the time of the first assessment, Simon was attending regular
classes and did not receive special educational assistance. He had
poor eye contact. His verbal communication initially seemed quite
advanced, but he was pedantic in his choice of words. His voice
was often too loud and his intonation theatrical. He often seemed
to become lost in his own thoughts, and this had a considerable
impact on his ability to hold conversations. Simon continually
repeated sentences he had heard in cartoons. At school, he was a
poor mixer, standing alone, and reading a book in the playground.
Simon was unable to give his parents a chronological account of
what he had done at school that day. For example, he might be
able to tell his parents in incredible detail how he had fallen down
in the schoolyard, but nothing else either before or after. He had
no knowledge of social rules. He frequently committed faux pas in
everyday life, such as asking people in the street if their dogs had
fleas. It was very difficult to gain access to his own representations,
feelings, emotions, and beliefs.
Simon had compulsive behavior, such as counting the steps as
he went up or downstairs, or putting his things in his schoolbag in
a particular manner. Simon was resistant to minor changes, such
as switching between short-sleeved and long-sleeved clothes. He
also displayed considerable restlessness, having difficulty sitting
still in class.
Simon had a sensory/perceptual hypersensitivity. He was wor-
ried by sounds such as applause, a baby crying, a vacuum
cleaner, or a hairdryer. He often put his hands over his ears,
even when his parents could not hear anything. This auditory
hypersensitivity was associated with acute attention to visu-
ospatial details. By 4 years, he could already complete quite
complex jigsaws. Simon was exceptionally good at construction
toys. Whenever his father bought a piece of flat pack furni-
ture, Simon was always the first to understand how to put it
together.
Therapeutic interventions during these 3 years included psychi-
atric consultations, individual psychotherapy sessions, educational
interventions, psychomotor therapy, and cognitive remediation.
Cognitive remediation is a specific and individualized training
program designed to reduce symptoms and improve cognitive
functions and psychosocial functioning. It consists of exercises
and practice of increasing difficulty, using a range of materials.
This program of cognitive remediation took place twice a week
over an 18 month period, and focused on a range of abilities
thought to underlie social interaction, including emotion percep-
tion, ToM, and pragmatic conversational abilities. The program
targeted the comprehension of complex social emotions, the attri-
bution of mental states (intentions, beliefs, feelings), the learning,
and comprehension of social rules, the estimation of the conse-
quences of one’s own behavior, and the comprehension of humor,
irony, metaphoric utterances, and indirect requests. Simon also
joined a social skills training group for a year. Social skills train-
ing seeks to improve social functioning. It is a structured method
designed to teach the social interaction skills needed to build and
foster interpersonal relationships, and promote the maintenance
and generalization of these skills in everyday life. Group-based
training in social skills means that the group dynamics can be
used to facilitate therapeutic interactions in the “here and now.”
The program consisted of 20 sessions over 7 months and targeted
the following social skills: recognizing non-verbal communica-
tion, identifying, and expressing emotions, introducing oneself,
and listening to others, starting, maintaining, and ending a con-
versation, making demands, making, and receiving compliments
and criticism, reacting to teasing, giving, and receiving presents.
All the sessions followed the same sequence of activities: (1) joke of
the day, (2) review of the previous week’s homework assignments,
(3) introduction of a new skill, (4) practice (direct instruction,
modeling, role play, etc.), (5) presentation of the new homework
assignments, and (6) social play time.
NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL EXAMINATIONS
A general cognitive assessment was conducted three times. It cov-
ered intellectual ability (Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children,
WISC-IV; Wechsler, 2005), attention, executive functions (Tower
of London, Visual attention, Auditory attention, Response set, and
Verbal fluency subtests of the Developmental Neuropsychological
Assessment, NEPSY; Korkman, 2003; Stroop-Drawing; Pennequin
et al., 2004), working memory (WISC-IV, Corsi blocks; Pagu-
layan et al., 2006), and episodic memory (Rivermead Behavioral
Memory Test; Wilson et al., 2000).
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Theory of mind abilities were assessed using a false-belief task
(Desgranges et al., 2012). This task was based on false-belief car-
toon tasks such as“Sally and Ann”(Wimmer and Perner, 1983). We
used eight short comic strips illustrating first-order false-belief sce-
narios that had been developed within our laboratory. Each comic
strip comprised three pictures with a short written description (for
examples, see Bon et al., 2009; Desgranges et al., 2012). The aim
was to understand the story by reading the scenario, then answer a
question with two possible responses. There were two conditions.
In the ToM condition, the question was about the belief of one
of the characters in the story. In the control condition, the ques-
tion probed Simon’s understanding of the reality of the cartoon
scenario. The pictures and written descriptions remained visible
throughout.
Autobiographical memory was assessed using an adaptation
of the Test Episodique de Mémoire du Passé autobiographique
(TEMPau task), a semi-structured autobiographical question-
naire validated in school-age children (Piolino et al., 2007; Picard
et al., 2009). Briefly, this task explored personal information
and specific events pertaining to three different lifetime peri-
ods (current school year, previous school year, and earlier school
years).
For each period, personal information had to be recalled on
four different topics: the names of acquaintances, personally rele-
vant famous names (heroes, stars, etc.), information about school
life, and personal addresses and regular activities. Specific instruc-
tions were given for each period (e.g., “Can you give me the
names of three people from among your acquaintances during this
period, such as the name of a friend, a neighbor, or a teacher?”).
Simon was asked to supply this information as accurately as possi-
ble. In particular, he was asked to avoid giving information that was
applicable to several periods and to provide information specific
to the period under examination.
Concerning personal events, Simon was asked to recall specific,
personally experienced events associated with specific dates for the
current year period and prompted by three general topics (i.e., a
school event, a trip, or vacation, and a family event) for the other
two periods. For the current school year, six questions were used to
conduct a chronological study of the previous months (last sum-
mer, last Christmas, last week, 2 days ago, yesterday, and today).
Simon was asked to remember specifically experienced events that
had lasted less than a day and which he could relive with details
and situate in time and space (e.g., “Describe out loud and with
as many details as possible, what happened, as if you were reliving
it: what you did and felt, the circumstances, with whom, where,
and how it happened”). Specific instructions were given for each
theme, such as “Give details of a particular event that took place in
your family life.” Simon was always asked to give as many details
as he could. Where necessary, if he had difficulty carrying out the
task, two types of help could be provided. If he failed to produce
any recollections, he was prompted with cues (e.g., “A day with
a teacher or a school friend”). If he produced a general memory,
he was encouraged to be more specific about the spatiotemporal
context and to describe the circumstances of a particular inci-
dent (“Does this remind you of a particular day?”, “Did this only
happen once?”). The autobiographical questionnaire was provided
to Simon’s parents before the test to collect specific information
about his life and all the recollections he produced were checked
with his parents after the test.
Scores were calculated separately for personal information and
events, and for each period. For personal events, each event was
scored on a four-point episodic scale, which took into account
the specificity of the content (single or repeated event), the spa-
tiotemporal context (place, date, and time), and the presence of
specific details (perceptions, thoughts, images, emotions, etc.). An
overall personal event score was obtained by adding up the points
recorded per period, taking all types of recall into account, both
specific and generic. For each period, the maximum score was 12
(four points per topic and three topics per period). Each accurately
recalled item of personal information was scored half a point, in
order to have a maximum score of 12 per period, to compare with
personal event score.
Performances were compared with those of controls published
in Piolino et al. (2007). Controls were typically developing volun-
teer children, recruited from elementary and junior high schools.
None of them had any neurological or psychiatric medical history
and repeated a year. For this study, Simon’s performances col-
lected in 2007 and 2008 were compared with those of 14 controls
aged from 7 to 8 (M = 8.14 years, SD= 0.77 years), and for the last
examination conducted in 2010, performances were compared to
those of 14 controls aged from 9 to 10 years old (M = 10.02 years,
SD= 0.56 years). Two independent experts rated each child’s pro-
duction: the tester who was different for the control group and
Simon and a rater blind to the age of children who was the same for
all children. In cases of disagreement, the data were re-examined
until a consensus was reached.
RESULTS
The three general cognitive assessments yielded normal results for
most of the tests (Table 1). Results on the WISC-IV indicated that
Simon consistently performed within the average range, albeit with
a significant decline in verbal comprehension, and superior per-
ceptual abilities indicated by the Perceptual Reasoning Index. The
neuropsychological examinations did not reveal any attention or
executive disorders, and although we noted a significant impair-
ment in the ability to generate words from a phonemic cue (NEPSY
Verbal Fluency), Simon performed normally in the third exam-
ination. Verbal and visuospatial working memory was normal.
Episodic memory, as measured with the Rivermead Behavioral
Memory Test, was also normal. The second assessment of ToM
with a first-order false-belief task (Desgranges et al., 2012) yielded
pathological results, but Simon’s performance was normal in the
third examination. For example, in the famous story“Maxi and his
chocolate,”a young boy called Maxi puts some chocolates in a green
cupboard. After Maxi has left the room, his mother moves the
chocolate to a blue cupboard. Maxi returns and wants his choco-
late (Wimmer and Perner, 1983). Simon was asked where Maxi
would look for the chocolate. The first time, Simon answered that
Maxi would look for his chocolate in the blue cupboard because
“his mother put it here.” In the second examination, however,
Simon concluded that Maxi would look for his chocolate in its
original location, because “he doesn’t know his mother moved it,”
adding “Nobody is telepathic!”Another story features a young boy
who, because of his small stature, has to stand on a box to speak to
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Table 1 | General cognitive assessment.
Tasks Simon’s scores
2007 2008 2010
WISC-IV
Verbal comprehension index 110 90 82
Perceptual reasoning index 135 114 124
Working memory index 109 103 112
Processing speed index 88 83 86
Control condition 1 47 68 73
Stroop-drawing Control condition 2 55 64 64
Interference condition 30 40 44
Verbal fluency (NEPSY)
Semantic criterion 8 23 26
Phonemic criterion 3* 4* 14
Visual attention
(NEPSY)
Precision (/40) 39 37 38
Auditory attention and
response set (NEPSY)
Score (/132) 105 105 102
Tower of London
(NEPSY)
Score (/20) 13 13 14
Knock and tap (NEPSY) Score (/30) 26 26 29
Digit span
Forward 6 6 5
Backward 3 4 5
Corsi blocks 5 5 7
Rivermead behavioral
memory test
Score (/22) 20 18 21
First-order false-belief Score (/8) / 3* 8
TheWISC-IV indices are shown in standard score format (M=100±15), whereas
the other measures are shown as raw scores.
*Indicates pathological scores.
his new neighbor over a high garden wall. Later on, his neighbor is
in the street and thinks she recognizes the boy. The final picture in
this comic strip shows two boys looking very similar, apart from
their different sizes (a tall one and a short one). Simon was asked
to say which one the neighbor would think she had chatted to. In
2008, Simon responded that it was the small boy, because “he is
small and has to stand on a box.” In 2010, however, Simon gave
the correct response (the tallest boy), adding that “She thinks he is
tall because of the box.”
Concerning AM, Simon exhibited a deficit in both compo-
nents – personal information and personal events (Figure 1). For
personal information, Simon performed just as well as controls for
the current school year (except for the second assessment). How-
ever, for the previous year and earlier years, Simon performed
below average in all three examinations.
Conversely, for personal events, at all three examinations,
Simon exhibited pathological performances for the current year,
below those of controls (though not significantly so) for the
previous school year, and as good as those of controls for the
earlier school years.
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FIGURE 1 | Production of personal information and events across the
three lifetime periods. *p < 0.05. Legend: Simon’s scores were compared
with those of controls matched on chronological age and published in
Piolino et al. (2007). Simon obtained pathological scores (Z <1.777;
p<0.05; df = 13) for personal information for the previous school year and
earlier school years, as well as for the current school year, though only in
2008. Personal event scores were only pathological for the current school
year period, although they were slightly low for the previous school year
period (1.35< z <1.77; 0.10<p < 0.05).
DISCUSSION
By distinguishing between events and personal information, and
by looking at how these memories change in the course of develop-
ment, our investigation of Simon’s AM revealed the relative preser-
vation of personal knowledge for the current year, but impairment
for the two previous periods. In terms of episodic AM develop-
ment, Simon produced normal childhood memories, but his more
recent ones were impaired.
SEMANTIC AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY
Bruck et al. (2007) also reported impairment of the semantic
component of AM, but without the preservation of the most
recent period. However, in their study, the authors assessed the
current year using 23 questions that were far more specific than
those administered in the present study (e.g., the names of the
child’s doctor, teacher, principal; the age and occupation of his
or her parents). This more detailed exploration may have been
more sensitive to mild impairment than our task. Nonetheless,
the pathological results regarding the two earlier periods sug-
gest that Simon forgot a significant proportion of his personal
or self-related information. In the 2010 examination, for example,
concerning information about his current school, Simon knew
the name of his teacher and could provide some details about
his classroom, such as the location of his desk. For the previous
school year, however, Simon was only able to give his teacher’s
name, and for the earlier period, Simon was not able to produce
any details associated with his school. The longitudinal approach
we adopted proved highly informative. In 2007, Simon listed the
names of three ferries he used to travel on when he lived in another
country. By 2008, he had forgotten two of them and only pro-
duced the third one when the examiner prompted him with the
first two names. In 2010, he was not able to cite a single name.
Some personal information may be recalled with cues, but some
may be completely forgotten, as attested by some false produc-
tions (e.g., in 2008, the name of the teacher he had had 2 years
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earlier). These results suggest that personal information fades,
with retrieval difficulties first, followed by genuine, accelerated,
long-term forgetting. There are two possible explanations, not
necessarily mutually exclusive. First, this semantic pattern may
be explained by an abnormal mechanism of consolidation per se
that needs verbal communication and social interaction to be effi-
cient. Limited linguistic interactions and personal thoughts in ASD
prevent rehearsal which, in a typical context, strengthens seman-
tic memories (Kopelman and Bright, 2012). Second, there may
be a deficit in semanticization, or the episodic-to-semantic shift,
which also relies on verbal communication and social interaction
to turn episodic memories into semantic ones via a mechanism
of repetition and updating (Cermak, 1984). The limited verbal
interaction associated with the episodic memory deficit may also
hinder the addition of new semantic information, not least ency-
clopedic knowledge, as demonstrated by the decrease in verbal
comprehension assessed with the WISC-IV.
EPISODIC AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY
As regards the episodic component of AM and in accordance with
our predictions, results suggested a deficit in the production of
personal events associated with objective (i.e., spatiotemporal con-
text) and subjective phenomenological details, including thoughts
and emotions. These results mirror previous findings of impaired
episodic AM in high-functioning individuals. The representations
of events held by individuals with ASD are more general and tem-
porally non-specific (Crane and Goddard, 2008). They resemble
the event memories produced by younger typically developing
children before episodic memory has fully developed (Maister
and Plaisted-Grant, 2011). If Simon’s performances were similar
to those of controls for the earliest lifetime period (earlier school
years), it is because personal event memory for this period is not
yet truly episodic. Children with ASD are able to produce frag-
mented memories based mainly on perceptual images, sometimes
with disconcertingly specific details, but these are not integrated
into a temporal continuum (Newcombe et al., 2007). This devel-
opmental limitation explains why the ability to produce episodic
autobiographical memories associated with distant lifetime peri-
ods does not improve when children grow up (Picard et al., 2009).
Hence, the development of episodic memory may be limited to a
primary level containing some specific details but without recol-
lective abilities or the subjective experience of mental time travel.
For example, in 2008, Simon recalled his birthday party, which
had taken place 5 months earlier. He was able to list the people
who had been at the party, where it was with some specific places,
what he had eaten and some of the presents he had received, but all
these details were produced as though he were describing a picture.
When he was asked if he remembered that event and something
he did there, he answered “no.” He had no subjective experience
allowing him to recollect this personal event.
There are important interdependencies between episodic and
semantic AM. First, the semantic impairment may contribute
to the encoding and retrieval deficits in episodic memory. The
acquisition of complex episodic memories relies on semantic
information, while personal knowledge allows us to access specific
sensory/perceptual episodic memories. Episodic AM and seman-
tic AM are highly interconnected, especially during the early stages
of retrieval when personal semantic knowledge can aid mem-
ory search and retrieval operations (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce,
2000; Svoboda et al., 2006). Moreover, semantic AM develops ear-
lier and provides a foundation for the later and more gradual
development of episodic AM in typically functioning children
(Picard et al., 2009).
SOCIAL COGNITION AND AM
The follow-up showed an improvement in performances on the
first-order false-belief task. This may have contributed to the
improvement in Simon’s episodic AM by increasing his ability
to understand that that which is brought to mind during the
act of remembering refers to the mental state of a past experi-
ence (Perner, 2000; Naito, 2003; Perner et al., 2007). In young
adults with Asperger’s syndrome or high-functioning autism, cor-
relations have been found between performances on a test which
assesses the affective ToM (the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test)
and performances on an AM task (Adler et al., 2010). Therapeutic
interventions may have contributed to this relative improvement
in episodic AM. These interventions encourage verbalization and
narrative abilities, and may thus have affected Simon’s ability to
recount personal experiences. However, this improvement may
not be enough for children with ASD to reach a normal level
of AM function. Furthermore, false-belief task performance may
not always be a reliable indicator of representational ToM among
these children, who may draw on other cognitive abilities to per-
form this task (Lind and Bowler, 2009a,b). Thus, on the basis
of Simon’s results, we cannot entirely rule out the possibility of
impaired ToM. Further investigations are needed to conclude on
this point.
CONCLUSION
This longitudinal approach yielded further explanations for the
atypical functioning of AM in ASD. First, when we assessed per-
sonal information associated with specific and limited lifetime
periods (e.g., previous year), we were able to confirm the impair-
ment of the semantic component of AM that has previously been
reported in children with ASD. This impairment may also be
present in adulthood, but up to now, researchers have chosen to
use questionnaires assessing longer lifetime periods than in the
present study, covering more than 1 year (5 years for Crane and
Goddard, 2008). Second, we also demonstrated an impairment of
current and recent personal event memories, with the preserva-
tion of remote ones referring to event that occurred before the age
of 7 years. These results suggest that patients with ASD may have
a basic form of episodic memory resembling the event memory
observed in children under six. Third, we observed an encourag-
ing qualitative improvement in AM that may have resulted from
a combination of different factors, including development, family
support, and therapeutic interventions.
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